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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
SUMMARY 
ZOBREST v. CATALINA FOOTHILLS 
SCHOOL DISTRICT: SHOULD THE WALL 
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE COME 
CRUMBLING DOWN? FUNDING SIGN 
LANGUAGE INTERPRETERS AND THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,t the Ninth 
Circuit held that the school district's failure to provide a state-
paid sign language interpreter to a handicapped student while 
he .attended a sectarian school did not violate the First Amend-
ment of the Constitution.2 Specifically, the court held the school 
district's conduct did not violate the Establishment Clauses or 
the Free Exercise Clause.4 With regard to the former the court 
determined that the interpreter would have worked in a school 
1. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir.) (per Fletcher, J.; 
with whom Reinhardt, J., joined; Tang, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 
(1992). 
2. [d. at 1196-97. 
3. The first amendment of the Constitution provides, "Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... " 
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth 
amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
85 
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environment in which two functions, secular education and ad-
vancement of religious values or beliefs, were intertwined. II With 
regard to the latter, despite the burden on the student's free ex-
ercise of religion, the court found that a compelling state inter-
est justified the denial of the requested interpreter.a 
The Zobrest's petition for writ of certiorari before the 
United States Supreme Court has been granted.7 
II. FACTS 
James Zobrest is a student at Salpointe Catholic High 
School. 8 Salpointe is a religious school that integrates religious 
themes into the classroom.s 
Zobrest is profoundly deaf, which qualifies him as a handi-
capped child under the Federal Education of the Handicapped 
Act (EHA)10 and Arizona Rev. Statute § 15-761(6).11 Under both 
the EHA 12 and the Arizona legislation, Zobrest is entitled to 
have a sign language interpreter paid for by state funds.1s The 
5. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1196. 
6. [d. at 1196-97. 
7. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 
113 S. Ct. 52 (1992). 
8. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190, 1191 (9th Cir), cert. 
granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992). Salpointe Catholic High School is a private Roman Catho-
lic school. [d. at 1192. 
9. [d. The parties stipulated to these facts. Salpointe encourages its faculty to assist 
students in experiencing how the presence of God is manifest in nature, human'history, 
in the struggles for economic and political justice, and other secular areas of the curricu-
lum. [d. 
10. [d.; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1) which provides: "[T)he term 'handicapped 
children' means mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech or language impaired, 
visually handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, or other 
health impaired children, or children with special learning disabilities, who by reason 
thereof require special education and related services." 
11. Arizona has a statutory scheme designed to meet the educational needs of hand-
icapped students and to qualify it for federal assistance under EHA. 
12. The bulk of EHA benefits are targeted for students enrolled in public schools. 
Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1192 n.l. When handicapped children are voluntarily enrolled in 
private schools, the state does not need to pay their tuition. 34 C.F.R. § 300.403(a). How-
ever, the state and local school district must provide special education and related ser-
vices to the private school children. 34 C.F.R. § 300.452(a). 
13. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1192. If James attended a public or non-religious private 
school in Arizona, the school district would assume full financial responsibility for the 
employment of a sign language interpreter, See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.13. 
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Deputy· County Attorney informed the school district that be-
cause secular education and religious beliefs are intertwined at 
Salpointe, a sign language interpreter would have to translate 
religious precepts and beliefs.l4 Therefore, the Deputy County 
Attorney argued, that furnishing an interpreter to translate reli-
gious beliefs would violate. both state and federal constitutional 
prohibitions against state establishment of religion. 111 The Ari-
zona Attorney General agreed with the Deputy County Attor-
ney's opinion.16 
In August 1988, the Zobrests initiated a civil action under 
the EHA seeking a mandatory injunction compelling the school 
district to provide Zobrest with an interpreter.17 The district 
court denied the Zobrests' request for a preliminary injunction,18 
but granted the school district's motion for summary judgment, 
holding that the furnishing of a sign language interpreter would 
in fact offend the First Amendment.19 
14. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1192. The Deputy County Attorney of Pima County gave 
this advice in the summer of 1988 before James Zobrest's enrollment which began in 
August 1988. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1192. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a) which provides: 
Any State educational agency, any local educational agency, 
and any intermediate educational unit which receives assis-
tance ... shall establish and maintain procedures ... to assure 
that handicapped children and their parents or guardians are 
guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provi-
sion of free appropriate public education by such agencies and 
units. 
18. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1192. The court found the Zobrests had not demonstrated a 
likelihood of success on the merits, because the provision of an interpreter would likely 
offend the first amendment's establishment clause. [d. 
19. [d. at 1192-93. The district court noted the interpreter would act as a conduit 
for the religious inculcation of James, thereby promoting James' religious development 
at government expense. [d. That kind of entanglement of church and state is not al-
lowed. [d. at 1193. Note that the district court agreed with the Pima County Deputy 
Attorney and the Arizona Attorney General that the first amendment would be offended 
by the furnishing of a sign language interpreter. [d. The court passed on the question of 
whether the employment of a sign language interpreter would also violate the Arizona 
Constitution. [d. 
3
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III. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. MAJORITY OPINION 
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's summary 
judgment de novo.20 The court made the following determina-
tions of fact: (1) to obtain federal funds through the EHA, a 
state must offer free appropriate public education to all handi-
capped children within its jurisdiction;21 and (2) school districts 
must provide services to handicapped students to meet their 
special educational needs.22 
The Ninth Circuit held that the school district was not re-
quired to furnish Zobrest with an interpreter using state funds. 23 
The court determined that providing Zobrest with a state 
funded interpreter would violate the Establishment Clause.24 In 
addition, the court held that the school district's refusal to pro-
vide Zobrest with a state funded sign language interpreter at a 
sectarian school did not violate the Free Exercise Clause.211 
20. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir.), cert. 
granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992). When the court reviews the summary judgment de novo, 
the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to deter-
mine whether there were genuine issues of material fact. [d. The court also reviewed 
whether the district court applied the law correctly. [d. 
21. [d. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1), which provides: 
In order to qualify for assistance ... a State shall demonstrate 
... that: 
(1) the State ha~ in effect a policy that assures all handi-
capped children the right to a free appropriate public 
education. 
(2) The State has developed a plan ... [setting] forth in detail 
the policies and procedures which the State will undertake in 
order to assure that 
(A) there is established a goal providing full educational op-
portunity to all handicapped children, a detailed timetable for 
accomplishing such a goal, and a description of the kind and 
number of facilities, personnel, and services necessary 
throughout the State to meet such a goal. 
22. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1193. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(4)(A) which provides: 
that, to the extent consistent with the number and location of 
handicapped children in the State who are enrolled in private 
elementary and secondary schools, provision is made for the 
participation of such children in the program assisted or car-
ried out ... by providing for such children special education 
and related services. 
23. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1196. 
24. [d. 
25. [d. at 1197. 
4
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1. The Establishment Clause 
The United States Supreme Court has developed a three 
part test to determine whether a statute is constitutional under 
the Establishment Clause.1I6 A statute will be deemed constitu-
tional if: (1) the statute has a secular legislative purpose;27 (2) 
the statute's primary effect is one that neither advances nor in-
hibits religion; and (3) the statute does not foster an excessive 
government entanglement with religion.28 
The Ninth circuit held that the EHA and its Arizona coun-
terpart legislation passed the first prong of the Lemon v. Kurtz-
man test.29 The statute30 at issue manifests a secular purpose.31 
Congress' intended secular purpose was to assure that a free, ap-
propriate public education is available to all handicapped 
children.32 
However, the court held that the proposed application of 
the statute did not pass the second prong of this test because 
the statute, in its application, would have a non-secular effect.ss 
26. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983). 
27. The Supreme Court is reluctant to accuse the statute's writers of unconstitu-
tional motives, when there is a feasible secular purpose on the face of the statute. [d. at 
394-95. 
28. [d. The three part test is called the Lemon u. Kurtzman test. Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
29. [d. 
30. The Federal Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §1400 [hereinafter 
EHA]. . 
31. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1193. 
32. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1991) provides: 
It is the purpose of this Act to assure that all children with 
disabilities have available to them ... a free appropriate pub-
lic education which emphasizes special education and related 
services designed to meet their unique needs; to assure that 
the rights of children with disabilities and their parents or 
guardians are protected, to assist States and localities to pro-
vide for the education of all children with disabilities, and to 
assess and assure the effectiveness of efforts to educate chil-
dren with disabilities. 
The Arizona statute that is the counterpart to the EHA has a similar goal. Zobrest, 
963 F.2d at 1193. 
33. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1193-94. The Supreme Court generally evaluates the valid-
ity of a statute on its face. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 600 (1988). In this case the 
court evaluated one specific proposed application of the statute because the statute is 
extremely broad. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1194 n.3. 
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The Ninth Circuit observed that an interpreter would be the in-
strumentality that conveys the religious message.34 The presence 
of a government employee in a sectarian class would create the 
symbolic union of government and religion in a joint enterprise, 
prohibited under the Establishment Clause.31i Thus, using state 
assistance to provide an interpreter for Zobrest was not secular 
or separable.36 
The majority did not address the is'sue of whether the stat-
ute passed the third prong of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test. 
2. The Free Exercise Clause 
The United States Supreme Court has held that when the 
government forces an individual to elect between following or 
abandoning their religious beliefs in order to receive state pro-
vided benefits, the government places a burden on the individ-
ual's free exercise of religion.37 This burden, therefore, violates 
the Free Exercise Clause unless justified by a compelling state 
interest.88 
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit determined that the denial 
of aid to Zobrest imposed a burden on his free exercise of reli-
gion.89 The court reasoned that Zobrest would have to make a 
choice.40 He would either have to give up a sectarian education, 
in order to receive aid to pay for an interpreter, or he would 
have to pay for the interpreter himself while enrolled at 
Salpointe. n 
The Ninth Circuit further held that the state had a compel-
ling interest in ensuring that the Establishment Clause is not 
violated, and that this interest justified the burden on Zobrest's 
free exercise of religion.42 Thus, refusing to provide Zobrest with 
34. [d; at 1194. 
35. [d. 
36. [d. at 1196. 
37. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963). 
38. [d. at 406. 
39. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1196. 
40. [d. 
41. [d. 
42. [d. at 1196·97. The Ninth Circuit determined that there are no less restrictive 
means by which the state can prevent the establishment clause from being violated. [d. 
6
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a state paid interpreter while he is enrolled at a sectarian school 
did not constitute a free exercise violation.43 
B. DISSENTING OPINION 
Judge Tang argued that furnishing Zobrest with a state 
funded sign language interpreter while enrolled at Salpointe 
does not violate the First Amendment's prohibition against the 
establishment of religion." In addition, Judge Tang concluded 
that the Free Exercise Clause was violated because there was no 
compelling state interest justifying withholding funds for a sign 
language interpreter.4!! 
1. The Establishment Clause 
Judge Tang agreed with the majority that the EHA and the 
Arizona counterpart legislation passed the first prong of the 
Lemon v. Kurtzman test.46 He also observed that although a 
state funded sign language interpreter would benefit religion or 
religious exercise, a secular purpose could still be' found.47 Fur-
thermore, he reasoned that cultivating talents and skills in 
handicapped children and removing barriers to achieving full ac-
ademic potential are valid secular interests."6 Judge Tang thus 
concluded that neither the EHA nor the Arizona counterpart 
legislation's purpose was to endorse or promote religion."9 
However, Judge Tang disagreed with the majority's holding 
that the EHA and the Arizona counterpart legislation did not 
pass the second prong of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test. He rea-
soned that, through their interpretation of precedent,!!O the ma-
jority had elevated form over substance at the expense of handi-
43. [d. 
44. [d. 
45. [d. at 1204. 
46. [d. 
47. [d.; see also Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servo for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 
485-86 (1986); Mueller V. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395 (1983); Hunt V. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 
741 (1973). 
48. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1198. 
49. [d. 
50. [d. "The majority raises the specter of a symbolic union of church and state, and 
dismisses as inapplicable cases in which similar general educational welfare programs 
have passed constitutional muster." [d. 
7
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capped children:n Specifically, Judge Tang asserted that the 
is.sue was whether the program as a whole had the proscribed 
primaryG2 effect of advancing religion, GS rather than the major-
ity's focus on the specific use in which the aid was used.G4 How-
ever, Judge Tang noted that the Supreme Court has not consist-
ently applied the primary effects prong of the Lemon u. 
Kurtzman test. GG 
Judge Tang concluded, however, that even if the majority's 
interpretation of the second prong of the Lemon u. Kurtzman 
test was correct, providing aid for a sign language interpreter 
does not have the primary effect of advancing religion.G6 He ar-
gued that the majority misapplied School District of Grand 
Rapids u. BallG7 and Meek v. Pittenger G8 to conclude that pro-
viding aid has the principle effect of advancing religion:19 
Judge Tang argued that four factors distinguish Ball and 
Pittenger from Zobrest.~o First, in Zobrest, general welfare legis-
51. [d. "The Establishment Clause will tolerate measures that only indirectly im-
pact upon religion." Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 
756, 771 (1973). "Not every law that confers an indirect, remote, or incidental benefit 
, upon religious institutions is, for that reason alone, constitutionally invalid." [d. 
52. "The use of the word primary in the [Lemon v. Kurtzman] test connotates a 
survey of the legislation's total operation, rather than its particular application in the 
pending case." Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1199. 
53. [d. at 1198; see also Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servo for the Blind, 474 U.S. 
481, 487-88 and 492. In Witters a blind student was pursuing a program of religious 
studies at a Christian college. [d. He applied for Washington's vocational rehabilitation 
assistance. [d. The Supreme court in Witters held that the second prong of the Lemon U. 
Kurtzman test (primary effect) did not forbid the aid. [d. 
54. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1198; see also Mueller V. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 397. In Muel-
ler the court looked at the broad class of beneficiaries of a tax exemption, including all 
parents of school aged children, whether their child was enrolled in public or private 
schools, and concluded that "[t]he provision of benefits to so broad a spectrum ... is an 
important index of secular effect." Mueller, 463 U.S. at 397. 
55. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1199; see also Hunt V. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 742 (In Hunt 
the Supreme Court did not consider the general operation of a governmental program 
rather it looked to a particular application in assessing primary effect). 
56. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1199. 
57. School Dist. of Grand Rapids V. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985). In Ball teachers paid 
by the state taught secular classes in private schools which lowered the private schools' 
costs. Ball, 473 U.S. at 395-97. 
58. Meek V. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). In Pittenger the state provided instruc-
tional materials and equipment to the religious school which lowered their educational 
costs for their students. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 365-66. 
59. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1199. 
60. [d. 
8
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lation is involved, whereas in Pittenger and Ball the legislation 
was directed solely at private schools.61 General welfare pro-
grams that are available to all children, whether in public or pri-
vate schools, are not unconstitutional because they benefit the 
entire population.62 Therefore, cases involving aid directed to re-
ligious institutions should not be controlling in Zobrest.63 
Seco~d, the legislation in Pittenger and Ball, involved aid 
that compensated religious schools for the educational costs of 
their students.64 Those legislative schemes are distinguishable 
from the legislation in Zobrest, which would not have the funds 
go to Salpointe but rather to the interpreter.611 The legislation 
would not relieve Salpointe of any financial or educational 
burdens.66 
Third, the legislation in Pittenger and Ball gave religious 
schools direct educational assistance.67 In Zobrest, Salpointe 
does not directly benefit as a result of the EHA.68 The EHA 
benefits are implemented at a sectarian school not because of 
any legislation, but because Zobrest elected to enroll at a secta- . 
rian school. 69 
61. Id. 
62. Id. The Supreme Court considers who the primary beneficiaries of legislation are 
when it determines whether a statute's primary effect is to benefit religion. In general, 
religious schools are not the primary beneficiaries of welfare legislation. Rather they are 
incidental beneficiaries of the legislation. "[Pjrograms targeted exclusively at religious 
entities are probably unconstitutional." Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. I, 10-11 
(1989). 
63. Bullock, 489 U.S. at 10-11. 
64. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1200. 
65. Id. James' interpreter is not employed or paid by Salpointe but is paid and em-
ployed by the public school district. Id. . 
66. Id. Salpointe would not employ or pay a sign language interpreter without state 
aid. Id. Either the Zobrests would have to payor James would be without an interpreter 
while enrolled at Salpointe. Id. In fact, the Zobrests hired an interpreter while awaiting 
the outcome of this case. Id. 
67.Id. 
68.Id. 
69. Id. Salpointe benefits from the EHA only as a consequence of James decision to 
attend that school. Id. The historic purposes of the establishment clause simply do not 
encompass the sort of attenuated financial benefit, ultimately controlled by the private 
choices of individual parents, that eventually flows to parochial schools from the neu-
trally available ... benefit at issue in this case. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 400. Tang 
noted that the Supreme Court in Witters determined that it was significant to note that 
religious schools received benefits "only as a result of the genuinely independent and 
private choices of aid recipients" to attend a religious educational institution. Witters v. 
Washington Dept. of Servo for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487. "The pupil not the state 
9
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Judge Tang concluded that under the EHA and the Arizona 
legislation, the state and sectarian schools could not dictate 
whether a sectarian school would benefit financially.70 In this 
case, unlike the schools in Ball and Pittenger, Salpointe never 
saw the funds, because the sign language interpreter was an em-
ployee of the state's local school district.71 Only Zobrest and his 
parents benefitted from the funds.72 
Fourth, in Ball there was a symbolic union of church and 
state through the legislation's benefits. Here, paying a sign lan-
guage interpreter does not establish a symbolic union.7S An im-
permissible union of church and state is not necessarily created 
when state funds are used to convey both secular and sectarian 
ideas.74 The teachers in parochial schools are the source of reli-
gious doctrine, not the interpreter.7& 
Judge Tang determined that the First Amendment does not 
contain an absolute prohibition against the placement of state 
employees in religious schools.7/! As a result he concluded that 
the majority placed undue emphasis on the fact that a state 
funded interpreter would perform services in a sectarian class-
room.77 First Amendment rights are contingent upon the sub-
stantive nature and quality of the aid provided, not to whom the 
money is paid.78 
determined whether a religious institution would receive any of the available funds." 
Zobrest 963 F.2d at 1201. 
70. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1201. 
71. [d. 
72. [d. The Zobrests would no longer have to pay for the interpreter at their ex-
pense. [d. 
73. [d. 
74. [d. The state is simply funding education for handicapped students in a general 
and nondiscriminatory manner. [d. 
75. [d. "The role played by the interpreter is narrow, isolated, and unique". [d. 
76. [d.; see also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 241-44 (1977) (Health technicians 
may be provided by the state to parochial schools.); Board of Education of Central Sch. 
Dist. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-44 (Textbooks may be provided by the state to parochial 
school students.). Tang noted that in Witters sectarian school teachers' salaries were 
contributed to from state funds that were used to pay for sectarian student's tuition. The 
funds went directly from the state to the student, then through the student to the secta-
rian school. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1201. 
77. [d. 
78. [d. "But First Amendment rights should not depend on how circuitous a money 
trail the government constructs." [d. "Functional analysis, not formalistic line-drawing, 
must be undertaken." [d. 
10
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In addition, Judge Tang reasoned that sign language inter-
preters are technical assistants of communication79 that perform 
the mechanical service of changing words from one language to 
another.80 He . observed that sign language interpreters are "not 
potential founts of religious doctrine" li.ke teachers.81 A sign lan-
guage interpreter is like eye glasses or a hearing aid that conveys 
communication and is not an independent source of the ideas 
communicated.82 Judge Tang concluded that the distinction be-
tween the funding of a sign language interpreter and a hearing 
aid is immaterial. 83 
The symbolic union theory is further undercut in this dis-
sent, because the interpreter would only be involved with one 
student, thus ensuring that the public would not be confused by 
where the state service ends and the religion begins.8• In addi-
tion, the interpreter is placed in the classroom by the parents' 
decision, not the state's action.8Ci 
Judge Tang determined that "[r]ather than suggest an im- . 
permissible connection between church and state, the provision 
of an interpreter would simply demonstrate to the public the 
government's desire to equalize the educational opportunities of 
all its students and to help handicapped students overcome bar-
riers to their full academic development."88 For the above rea-
sons, Judge Tang concluded that funding from the EHA for a 
sign language interpreter did not have the primary effect of ad-
vancing religion.87 
79. [d. at 1202. Hearing aids and eyeglasses are used as modes of communication. 
[d. "[T)hese products, like an interpreter make it possible for a [handicapped) ... stu-
dent to receive and decipher religious messages." [d. "[J)ames Zobrest requires human 
rather than purely mechanical assistance in the classroom." [d. 
80. [d. at 1201-02. "An interpreter neither adds to nor detracts from the message 
she conveys, nor does she interject personal views and philosophies into the translation." 
[d. 
81. [d. 
82. [d. 
83. [d. The majority did not appear to determine that the first amendment would 
be offended by state funding for eye glasses or hearing aids for sectarian students. [d. 
84. [d. The other students education will not be involved with the interpreter. [d. 
85. [d. at 1202. 
86. [d. "Such aid is religion-blind." [d. 
87. [d. 
11
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Although, the majority did not rule on the third prong of 
the Lemon v. Kurtzman test,88 Judge Tang addressed the issue 
of excessive government entanglement with religion.89 He con-
cluded that the legislation does not promote excessive govern-
ment entanglement,90 noting that when funds are provided to a 
student, it is necessary to determine whether the resulting rela-
tionship between church and state violates the Establishment 
Clause.91 Judge Tang emphasized that the mere existence of an 
interrelationship between the school district, as a state agency 
and, Salpointe, a sectarian school, does not necessarily violate 
the First Amendment.92 The First Amendment, he reasoned, is 
violated only when the interrelationship is excessive.9s 
Moreover, he observed that two questions must be resolved 
when conducting an analysis of the third prong of the Lemon v. 
Kurtzman test.94 The first question is whether the government 
would have to unconstitutionally intrude into Salpointe's reli-
gious activity in order to supervise the interpreter's job perform-
ance.911 The second question addresses the nature of the sign lan-
guage interpreter's job, and whether it impermissibly involved a 
state employee in religious matters.96 
First, both the Zobrests and the state recognized that state 
officials would have to supervise the interpreter.97 Judge Tang 
determined that this type of supervision does not create levels of 
state and church involvement that violate the Constitution. He 
explained that the Constitution tolerates limited supervision be-
tween sectarian schools and state officials.98 
88. [d. at 1196. 
89. [d. at 1203. 
90. [d. 
91. [d. 
92. [d. 
93. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1203. 
94. [d. 
95. [d. 
96. [d. at 1203-04. 
97. Zob~est, 963 F.2d at 1203. There would be periodic evaluations of the inter-
preter's quality of work. [d. 
98. [d.; see also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (The establishment clause 
was not. violated when state diagnostic health services were given to sectarian school 
students because there was limited contact between state officials, religious teachers, and 
students.); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 (1983) (A tax deduction for the expense of 
textbooks was upheld for parents of students in sectarian schools, despite the state hav-
ing to determine whether the textbooks promoted religion.). 
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No additional supervision would be necessary simply be-
cause the interpreter worked at a sectarian' schoo1.99 Further-
more, the evaluations of the interpreter's work would not involve 
state officials in religious matters.100 Judge Tang concluded that 
such routine supervision was "sufficiently contained and abbre-
viated to prevent excessive entanglement."lol 
Second, there must also be an inquiry into the nature of the 
sign language interpreter's job. l02 Judge Tang concluded that the 
nature of the interpreter's job did not entail excessive entangle-
ment between church and state.103 
A sign language interpreter, in contrast to teachers or ther-
apists, does not have opportunities to foster or transmit personal 
sectarian ideas. lo, Like the eye glasses or hearing aid the inter-
preter would neutrally translate the message from the teacher 
into a form Zobrest could comprehend. l06 Therefore, funding of 
a sign language interpreter does not violate the Establishment 
Clause.l08 
2. The Free Exercise Clause 
Judge Tang did agree with the majority that denying 
Zobrest a sign language interpreter unconstitutionally burdened 
99. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1203·04. Since the supervision would be limited to the in· 
terpreter's job performance it would not involve "comprehensive, discriminatory, and 
continuing state surveillance" which is precluded by the third prong of the Lemon v. 
Kurtzman test. Id. 
100. Id. at 1204. "[T]he supervision of [the] interpreter will not implicate religious 
concerns to the same extent as other Establishment Clause cases have." Id. 
Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. The court noted: 
103. Id. 
The parties stipulated that ... the interpreter's code of ethics 
obliges her to translate communications completely, without 
altering, editing, or revising in any manner the content of the 
message. [The parties also concede] that at times the inter· 
preter will be unable to affect a literal translation of a commu· 
nication, including religious messages. In .such circumstances, 
the interpreter must use her own judgment and, to the best of 
her ability, convey the message as accurately as possible. 
104. Id. at 1204·05. 
105. Id. at 1205. 
106. Id. "[T]he interpreter's role remains confined to a technical search for words 
and signs that closely approximate each other." Id. 
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his free exercise of religion. lo7 Yet, Judge Tang differed from the 
majority by concluding that funding for a sign language inter-
preter would not violate the Establishment Clause. He therefore, 
reasoned that the state does not have a compelling interest to 
justify withholding funds. lOS 
Ultimately, Judge Tang concluded that state funding for a 
sign language interpreter for a student enrolled in a sectarian 
school is a general welfare benefit.loe This benefit is distributed 
equally to all qualified students and is not an impermissible es-
tablishment of religion yo Moreover, the Free Exercise Clause is 
violated only when students in sectarian schools are excluded 
from a general welfare benefit.lll Thus, the Free Exercise Clause 
would be violated if Zobrest could not receive a state funded 
interpreter. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,112 the 
Ninth Circuit held that neither the Establishment Clause nor 
the Free Exercise Clause was violated by the refusal to provide a 
state funded sign language interpreter to a deaf student enrolled 
in a sectarian school. However, in a strong dissent, Judge Tang 
argued that the Establishment Clause would not be violated by 
the provision for a state paid interpreter, U3 and in turn, the Free 
Exercise Clause would be violated by the denial of such an 
interpreter.u , 
If the Supreme Court affirms the Ninth Circuit's opinion in 
this case, there will be little or no change in the manner in which 
state funds are distributed to handicapped students enrolled in 
lO7. Id. 
108. Id.; see also Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276 ("[TJhe State interest ... in achieving 
greater separation of Church and State than is already ensured under the Establishment 
Clause ... is limited by the Free Exercise Clause".). 
109. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1206. Funding for a sign language interpreter is "cau-
tiously delineated secular governmental assistance." Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 
113 S. Ct. 52 (1992). 
113. Id. at 1197. 
114. Id. at 1204. 
14
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss1/10
1993] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 99 
sectarian schools. If, however, the Supreme Court vacates the 
Ninth Circuit's opinion; there will be profound changes in this 
and similar First Amendment issues. Specifically, a change in 
the manner special education and integrated programs are fur-
nished to handicapped students enrolled in sectarian schools will 
result. 
If the Supreme Court mandates funding for a sign language 
interpreter for Zobrest, the wall traditionally erected between 
church and state will begin to erode. It may be the beginning of 
the wall crumbling down. 
Judith Sharon Rosen* 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993. 
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